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Abstract
We present two zero-sum games modeling situations where one
player attacks (or hides in) a finite dimensional nonempty compact
set, and the other tries to prevent the attack (or find him). The first
game, called patrolling game, corresponds to a dynamic formulation
of this situation in the sense that the attacker chooses a time and a
point to attack and the patroller chooses a continuous trajectory to
maximize the probability of finding the attack point in a given time.
Whereas the second game, called hiding game, corresponds to a static
formulation since both the searcher and the hider choose simultane-
ously a point and the searcher maximizes the probability of being at
distance less than a given threshold of the hider.
1 Introduction
To ensure the security of vulnerable facilities, a planner may deploy either
dynamic or static security devices. The dynamic case includes, but is not
limited to: soldiers or police officers patrolling the streets of a city, robots
patrolling a shopping mall, drones flying above a forest to detect fires, or
naval radar systems signaling the detection of an enemy ship. On the other
hand, security guards positioned in the rooms of a museum, security cameras
scrutinizing subway corridors, or motion detectors placed in a house are some
examples of static security devices. Note that these real-world situations
include both human and electronic agents. The paradigm we adopt is the one
of an adversarial threat, hence we propose a game theoretical approach to
these security problems. Some game theoretic security systems are already in
use, for example in the Los Angeles international airport (Pita et al. (2008))
and in some ports of the United States (Shieh et al. (2012)).
Motivated by the examples given above, we study two zero-sum games
in which a player (the patroller or searcher) aims to detect another player
(the attacker or hider). Patrolling games model dynamic security devices.
∗Toulouse School of Economics, Universite´ Toulouse 1 Capitole. E-mail address:
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In these games, the patroller moves continuously in a search space with
bounded speed. The attacker chooses a point in the search space and a time
to attack it. The attack takes a certain duration to be successful (think
of a terrorist needing time to set off a bomb). The patroller wins if and
only if he detects the attack before it succeeds. The case of static security
devices is modeled by hiding games, in which both the searcher and the hider
simultaneously deploy at a particular point in a search space, the searcher
wins if and only if the hider lies within his detection radius. We provide
links between patrolling and hiding games, and show how patrolling games
reduce to hiding games if the attack duration is zero, that is the patroller
has to detect the attack at the exact time it occurs, or if the patroller is
alerted of the attack point when the attack begins.
1.1 Contribution
For patrolling games, we prove that the value always exists and obtain a
general upper bound. We then study patrolling games on networks. In
particular we compute the value as well as optimal strategies for the class
of Eulerian networks. The special network composed of two nodes linked by
three parallel arcs is also examined and bounds on the value are computed.
Lastly, we study patrolling games on R2 and obtain an asymptotic expression
for the value as the detection radius of the patroller goes to 0.
For hiding games, we first focus on a particular class of strategies for
both the searcher and the hider called ”equalizing”. These strategies have
the property that if one exists, then it is optimal for both players. Our main
result regarding hiding games is an asymptotic formula for the value of hiding
games on a compact set with positive Lebesgue measure. A counterexample
based on a Cantor-type set showing that this last result cannot extend to
compact sets with zero Lebesgue measure is also presented.
Finally, we discuss some basic properties of monotonicity and continuity
of the value function of continuous patrolling and hiding games.
1.2 Related literature
Continuous patrolling and hiding games belong to the literature of search
and security games, consult Hohzaki (2016) for a survey. These games have
their source in search theory, a field of operations research whose origins
can be found in the works of Koopman (1956a,b, 1957). The use of game
theory in a search and security context goes back to the famous book of
Morse and Kimball (1951).
1.2.1 Patrolling games
Patrolling games were introduced by Alpern et al. (2011) in a discrete set-
ting, that is the patroller visits nodes of a graph, where the attacker can
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strike, at discrete times. A companion article Alpern et al. (2016a) is dedi-
cated to the resolution of patrolling a discrete line. The idea of investigating
a continuous version of patrolling games is suggested in Alpern et al. (2011).
In Alpern et al. (2016b), the authors solve the continuous patrolling game
played on the unit interval. Several papers in the field of search games have
dealt with the transcription of discrete models to a continuous ones, consult
Ruckle and Kikuta (2000) and Ruckle (1981).
Other models of games involving a patroller and an attacker can be
found in Basilico et al. (2012, 2015), in which the authors design algorithms
to solve large instances of Stackelberg patrolling security games on graphs.
Lin et al. (2013, 2014) use linear programming and heuristics to study a
large class of patrolling problems on graphs, with nodes having different
values. Zoroa et al. (2012) study a patrolling game with a mobile attacker
on a perimeter.
Continuous patrolling games are closely related to search games with an
immobile hider, introduced in the seminal book of Isaac (1999) and devel-
oped in the monographs of Gal (1980) and Alpern and Gal (2003). In these
games, a searcher intends to minimize the time necessary to find a hider.
Search games have been extensively studied, let us mention Gal (1979);
Alpern et al. (2008); Dagan and Gal (2008) for search games on a network.
In particular, see Bostock (1984); Pavlovic (1993), for the special network
consisting of two nodes linked by three parallel arcs, for which the solution
is surprisingly complicated.
1.2.2 Hiding games
The first published example of a hiding game goes back to Gale and Glassey
(1974). The proposers gave a solution to the problem of hiding in a disc
when the detection radius is r = 1/2. Later, Ruckle (1983) considered in his
book several examples of hiding games (hiding on a sphere, hiding in a disc,
among others). Computing the value of hiding games is in general a very
difficult task. Danskin (1990) improved substantially the resolution of the
hiding game played on a disc, he called the cookie-cutter game. However
the solution is not complete for small values of r and no progress has been
made since then, see also Alpern et al. (2013) and Washburn (2014). Hiding
games in a discrete setting, when the search space is a graph, have also been
studied, see Bishop and Evans (2013).
Games in which the payoff is the distance between the two points se-
lected by the players, introduced by Karlin (1959), have been extensively
studied, consult Ibragimov and Satimov (2012) and references therein. Al-
though these games resemble hiding games to a certain extent, the lack of
continuity of the payoff function in hiding games makes their analysis much
more involved.
Finally, ambush games can be seen as hiding games in which the players
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select not one, but several points in the unit interval, consult Zoroa et al.
(1999); Baston and Kikuta (2004, 2009) for more details.
1.3 Organization of the paper
The paper is organized as follows. In section 2 the models of patrolling and
hiding games are formally presented. Section 3 is dedicated to patrolling
games, and section 4 is dedicated to hiding games. Finally in section 5 we
give some basic properties of the value function of continuous patrolling and
hiding games. The proofs that are not included in the body of the paper
are postponed to the appendix section 6.
1.4 Notations
In all the article, Rn is endowed with a norm denoted ‖ · ‖, which induces a
metric d. For all x ∈ Rn and r > 0, the closed ball of center x with radius
r is denoted Br(x) = {y ∈ Rn | ‖x− y‖ ≤ r}. For all Lebesgue measurable
set B ⊂ Rn, λ(B) denotes its Lebesgue measure. Finally, λ(Br) denotes the
Lebesgue measure of any ball of radius r.
Let X be a topological space, the set of Borel probability measures on
X is denoted ∆(X), and the set of probability measures on Y with finite
support is denoted ∆f (Y ).
2 The models
2.1 Patrolling games
In a patrolling game two players, an attacker and a patroller, act on a set
Q called the search space, which is assumed to be a nonempty compact
subset of Rn. An example of this could be a metric network, as defined in
section 3.3 below. The attacker chooses an attack point y in Q and a time
to attack t in R+. The patroller walks continuously in Q with speed at most
1. When the attack occurs at time t and point y, the patroller has a time
limit m ∈ R+ to be at distance at most r ∈ R+ of the attack point y. In this
case he detects the attack and wins, and otherwise he does not. Thus, m
represents the time needed for an attack to be successful, and r represents
the detection radius of the patroller.
A patrolling game is thus a zero-sum game given by a triplet (Q,m, r).
The attacker’s set of pure strategies is A = Q × R+. An element of A is
called an attack. The patroller’s set of pure strategies is W = {w : R+ →
Q | w is 1-Lipschitz continuous}. An element of W is called a walk. W is
endowed with the topology of compact convergence (consult the proof of
proposition 1 in the appendix section 6 and Munkres (2000) for details).
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The payoff to the patroller is given by
gm,r(w, (y, t)) =
{
1 if d(y,w([t, t +m])) ≤ r
0 otherwise,
where w([t, t +m]) = {w(τ) | τ ∈ [t, t+m]}.
2.2 Hiding games
In a hiding game two players, a searcher and a hider, act on a set Q, which
is again assumed to be a nonempty compact subset of Rn. An example of
this could be the unit interval, as considered in example 5, or a Cantor-type
set, as in example 4. Both players choose a point in Q. The searcher has a
detection radius r ∈ R+. He finds the hider if and only if the two points are
at distance at most r.
Hence, a hiding game is a zero-sum game given by a couple H = (Q, r).
The set of pure strategies of both players, the searcher and hider, is Q. The
payoff to the searcher is given by
hr(x, y) =
{
1 if ‖x− y‖ ≤ r
0 otherwise.
2.3 Links between patrolling and hiding games
Hiding games can be interpreted as two possible variants of patrolling games.
In the first variant, hiding games are considered as a particular class of
patrolling games in which the attack duration m is taken equal to 0. Indeed,
consider a hiding game H = (Q, r) and a patrolling P = (Q, 0, r). In P , for
all w ∈ W and (y, t) ∈ A the payoff to the patroller is
g0,r(w, (y, t)) =
{
1 if ‖w(t) − y‖ ≤ r
0 otherwise.
A strategy x ∈ Q of the searcher in the hiding game H is mapped in the
patrolling game P to the constant strategy w ∈ W equal to x. Similarly,
a strategy y ∈ Q of the hider in H is mapped to the strategy (y, 0) ∈ A
in P . Any quantity guaranteed by the searcher in H is thus guaranteed by
the patroller in P . Conversely, any quantity guaranteed by the hider in H
is guaranteed by the attacker in P . Thus, since H and P have a value (see
propositions 1 and 3), the values of these two games are the same.
The second interpretation is as follows. Alpern et al. (2011) suggest
the study of patrolling games in which the patroller may be informed of
the presence of the attacker. Suppose that the patroller is informed of the
attack point when the attack occurs. Suppose also the search space Q is
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convex. The detection radius r is taken equal to 0 for simplicity. The payoff
of this game is
gm,0(w, (y, t)) =
{
1 if y ∈ w([t, t +m])
0 otherwise.
This patrolling game with signal is denoted P ′. In P ′, if the patroller’s
strategy is to choose a point and not move until the attack, then go to
the attack point in straight line when he is alerted, the attacker is time-
indifferent. In particular, the attacker has a best reply in the set of attacks
occurring at time 0. Symmetrically, if the attack occurs at time 0, the
patroller has a best reply consisting in choosing a starting point in Q and
going directly to the attack point when he is informed of the attack.
Thus, with the same mappings of strategies in the hiding game H ′ =
(Q,m) to strategies in P ′ as before, any quantity guaranteed by the searcher
in H ′ is guaranteed by the patroller in P ′. Conversely, any quantity guaran-
teed by the hider in H ′ is guaranteed by the attacker in P ′. Thus the values
of these two games are the same.
3 Patrolling games
3.1 The value of patrolling games
The first result is the existence of the value of a patrolling games. We denote
it VQ(m, r). In addition, we prove that the patroller has an optimal strategy
and the attacker has an ε-optimal strategy with finite support. The fact that
the patroller has an optimal strategy means that he can guarantee that the
probability of detecting the attack is at least VQ(m, r), no matter what the
attacker does. Similarly, the attacker can guarantee that the probability of
being caught is at most VQ(m, r), up to ε, no matter what the patroller does.
Hence, in patrolling games, the value represents the probability (up to ε) of
the attack being intercepted when both the patroller and the attacker play
(ε-)optimally.
Proposition 1. The patrolling game (Q,m, r) played with mixed strategies
has a value denoted VQ(m, r).
Moreover the patroller has an optimal strategy and the attacker has an
ε-optimal strategy with finite support, i.e., there exists µ ∈ ∆(W) such that
for any (y, t) ∈ A ∫
W
gm,r(w, (y, t))dµ(w) ≥ VQ(m, r),
and for every ε > 0 there exists ν ∈ ∆f (A) such that for any w ∈ W∫
A
gm,r(w, (y, t))dν(y, t) ≤ VQ(m, r) + ε.
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3.2 A general upper bound
Our goal is now to obtain a general upper bound for the value of patrolling
games. As in Alpern and Gal (2003), let us introduce the maximum rate at
which the patroller can discover new points of Q.
Definition 1. The maximum discovery rate is given by
ρ = sup
w∈W ,t>0
λ(w([0, t]) +Br(0)) − λ(Br)
t
.
The next remark shows that in R2 endowed with the Euclidean norm,
the maximum discovery rate is 2r, that is the sweep width of the patroller.
Similarly, in R and R3 endowed with the Euclidean norm, the maximum
discovery rate is respectively 1 and pir2.
Remark 1. Let (Q,m, r) be a patrolling game. If Q has nonempty interior
in R2 endowed with the Euclidean norm, then ρ = 2r.
Indeed, since Q has nonempty interior let x ∈ Q and s > 0 be such that
Bs(x) ⊂ Q. Define w(t) = x+ t
(
1
0
)
for t ∈ [0, s] (and arbitrarily such that
w ∈ W for t > s). Then
λ(w([0, s]) +Br(0)) − λ(Br)
s
=
2rs
s
= 2r,
and it is clear that this is the maximum.
Let us now give an upper bound for patrolling games whose search space
have nonzero Lebesgue measure. This upper bound is rather powerful and
will be extensively used in the remaining of the paper. It is in particular the
upper bound used to prove theorems 1, 2 and 3.
Proposition 2. Let Q be a search space such that λ(Q) > 0. Then
VQ(m, r) ≤ mρ+ λ(Br)
λ(Q)
.
To prove proposition 2, we define a strategy for the attacker called uni-
form. It corresponds to the strategy for which the attacker uniformly chooses
an attack point in Q, and attacks this point at time 0. Intuitively, a best
reply of the patroller is to cover as much points in Q as possible between
time 0 and time m.
Definition 2. Let Q be a search space such that λ(Q) > 0. The attacker’s
uniform strategy on Q, denoted aλ, is a random choice of the attack point
a at time 0 such that for all measurable sets B ⊂ Q,
aλ(B) =
λ(B)
λ(Q)
.
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Proof of proposition 2. For all w ∈ W, the payoff to the patroller when the
attacker plays aλ is∫
A
gm,r(w, (y, t))daλ(y, t) =
λ
(
w([0,m]) +Br(0)
)
λ(Q)
≤ mρ+ λ(Br)
λ(Q)
.
3.3 Patrolling a network
We now investigate the particular case of patrolling games on a network.
As in a network the patroller can manage to have a nonzero probability of
walking through the exact attack point, his detection radius r is set to 0.
3.3.1 Definition of a network
We follow the construction of a network of Fournier (2016). Let (V,E, l) be
a weighted undirected graph, V is the finite set of nodes and E the finite
set of edges whose elements e ∈ E are associated to a length l(e) ∈ R+. An
edge e ∈ E linking the two nodes s and t is also denoted (s, t).
We identify the elements of V with the vectors of the canonical basis of
R
|V |. The network generated by (V,E) is the set of points
N = {(s, t, α) | α ∈ [0, 1] and (s, t) ∈ E},
where (s, t, α) = αs + (1− α)t.
A network N is endowed with a natural metric d as follows. Let u1 and
u2 be two points of the same edge (s, t). There exist α1, α2 ∈ [0, 1] such
that u1 = (s, t, α1) and u2 = (s, t, α2). The distance d(u1, u2) is given by
d(u1, u2) = l(s, t)× |α1 − α2|.
If u and v are not in the same edge, consider the set of paths P (u, v)
between u and v as the set of all sequences (u1, . . . , un), n ∈ N∗ such that
u1 = u, un = v and such that for all i ∈ {1, . . . , n − 1}, ui and ui+1 belong
to the same edge. The distance d(u, v) is then defined as:
d(u, v) = inf
(u1,...,un)∈P (u,v)
n−1∑
i=1
d(ui, ui+1).
Finally, we define the Lebesgue measure on N . Let u1 = (s, t, α1) and
u2 = (s, t, α2), suppose α1 < α2. The set
[u1, u2] = {(s, t, α) | α ∈ [α1, α2]}
is called an interval. An interval [u1, u2] can be isometrically identified with
the real interval [α1l(s, t), α2l(s, t)]. As a subset of N can be identified with
a finite union of subsets of intervals, the Lebesgue measure on N is defined
as a natural extension of the Lebesgue measure on a real interval.
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3.3.2 Eulerian networks
For a particular class of networks called Eulerian, it is possible to compute
the value and optimal strategies of the game. Note that we use for net-
works a similar vocabulary to the one used in graph theory, see for example
Bondy and Murty (1982).
As stated in the next definition, an Eulerian tour is a closed path in N
visiting all points and having length λ(N ).
Definition 3. Let u ∈ N and pi = (u1, u2, . . . , un−1, un) ∈ P (u, u). If⋃n−1
k=1 [uk, uk+1] = N then pi is called a tour.
Moreover, if
∑n−1
k=1 λ([uk, uk+1]) = λ(N ), then pi is called an Eulerian
tour.
A network N is said to be Eulerian if there exists an Eulerian tour in
N .
Example 1. Figure 1 and figure 2 give two examples of networks. N1 is an
Eulerian network with Eulerian tour pi1 = (u1, u2, u3, u4, u5, u6, u3, u7, u1).
In contrast, N2 is not an Eulerian network.
u1
u2
u7 u4
u6
u5
u3
Figure 1: The network N1 is
Eulerian
u1
u2
u4
u3
Figure 2: The network N2 is
not Eulerian
Our objective is now to define the uniform strategy of the patroller for
Eulerian networks. This strategy is optimal for Eulerian networks. First,
we need to define a parametrization of the network.
Definition 4. Let N be an Eulerian network. A continuous function w
from [0, λ(N )] to N such that
i) w(0) = w(λ(N )),
ii) w is surjective.
iii) ∀t1, t2 ∈ [0, λ(N )] λ(w([t1, t2])) = |t1 − t2| (the speed of w is 1).
is called a parametrization of N .
Moreover such a w can be extended to a λ(N )-periodic function on R
which is still denoted w.
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Lemma 1. Let N be an Eulerian network, then there exists a parametriza-
tion of N .
It is now possible to define the uniform strategy of the patroller. The
idea behind this strategy is that the patroller uniformly chooses of a starting
point in N , and then follows a parametrization as defined in definition 4
above.
Definition 5. Suppose N is an Eulerian network. Let w be a parametriza-
tion of N . Denote (wt0)t0∈[0,λ(N )] the family of λ(N )-periodic walks such
that wt0(·) = w(t0 + ·). The patroller’s uniform strategy is given by the
uniform choice of t0 ∈ [0, λ(N )].
The next theorem is the main result on patrolling games for networks.
It gives a simple expression of the value of a patrolling games played on any
Eulerian network. The result relies on the fact that for such networks, the
patroller can achieve the upper bound of proposition 2 using his uniform
strategy.
Theorem 1. If N is an Eulerian network, then
VN (m, 0) = min
(
m
λ(N ) , 1
)
.
Moreover the attacker’s and the patroller’s uniform strategies are optimal.
3.3.3 A non Eulerian network
For non Eulerian networks, it may be difficult to compute the value of the
corresponding patrolling game. In the next example, we compute bounds on
the value of a patrolling game played over the network with three parallel
arcs, which is not Eulerian. For some values of the attack duration m, these
bounds are not tight.
Example 2. We consider again the network N2 represented in figure 2. In
this example, we take l(u1, u2) = l(u2, u3) = l(u1, u4) = l(u4, u3) = 1/2 and
l(u1, u3) = 1. Notice that λ(N2) = 3. We compute the following bounds on
the value of (N2,m, 0):
VN2(m, 0)

= m3 if m ≤ 2
∈
[
5m−2
3(m+2) , 1− 13
(
4−m
2
)2]
if m ∈
[
2, 103
]
∈
[
14−2m
3(6−m) , 1− 13
(
4−m
2
)2]
if m ∈
[
10
3 , 4
]
= 1 if m ≥ 4.
These bounds are plotted on figure 3 below.
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mVN2(m, 0)
2 4
1
2/3
Figure 3: Bounds on the value of the game as a function of m
First case: m ≤ 2. Recall that by proposition 2, VN2(m, 0) ≤ m3 for all
m ≥ 0.
Let us now introduce a particular class of walks as follows. Let pi1 =
(u1, u2, u3, u1, u4, u3) and pi
2 = (u3, u2, u1, u3, u4, u1) be two paths. pi
1 and
pi2 naturally induce two walks on [0, 3] at speed 1, respectively denoted w1
and w2. For all u ∈ N2 \ {u1, u3} and all i ∈ {1, 2} there exists a unique
tiu ∈ [0, 3] such that wi(tiu) = u. Now for all u ∈ N2\{u1, u3} and all t ∈ R+,
define
w1u(t) =

w1(t+ t1u) if t ∈
[
0, 3 − t1u
]
w2
(
t− (3(2k + 1)− t1u)
)
if t ∈ (3(2k + 1)− t1u, 3(2k + 2)− t1u]
w1
(
t− (3(2k + 2)− t1u)
)
if t ∈ (3(2k + 2)− t1u, 3(2k + 3)− t1u]
for all k ∈ N. The walk w1u starts at t1u and alternates between following
w1 and w2. The walk w2u is defined analogously: switch the superscripts 1
and 2 in the definition above. Denote µ0 the uniform choice of a walk in
(wiu)
i∈{1,2}
u∈N2\{u1,u3}.
It is not difficult to check that µ0 guarantees m/3 to the patroller (more-
over µ0 yields a payoff of m/3 for every (y, t) ∈ A). Hence VN2(m, 0) = m3 .
Second case: 2 < m < 4. We detail the computation for m = 3. The
walks w3, w4 and w5 hereafter can be adapted and similar strategies can be
used to derive the bounds for all m ∈ (2, 4).
Let us define three paths pi3, pi4 and pi5 as in figure 4, 5 and 6 respectively.
That is, pi3 = (u1, u2, u3, u5, u3, u1, u6, u1), pi
4 = (u1, u7, u1, u3, u8, u3, u4, u1)
and pi5 = (u1, u2, u3, u10, u3, u4, u1, u9, u1). Where u5 = (u3, u4, 1/2), u6 =
(u1, u4, 1/2), u7 = (u1, u2, 1/2), u8 = (u2, u3, 1/2), u9 = (u1, u3, 1/4) and
u10 = (u1, u3, 3/4).
pi3, pi4 and pi5 naturally induce three 3-periodic walks at speed 1, de-
noted respectively w3, w4 and w5. These are such that for i ∈ {3, 4, 5}, wi
intercepts any attack on wi([0, 3]) with probability 1.
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u1
u2 u4
u3
u5
u6
Figure 4: The path pi3
u7
u8
u1
u2 u4
u3
Figure 5: The path pi4
u1
u2 u4
u3
u9
u10
Figure 6: The path pi5
With a slight abuse of notation, for y ∈ [0, 1/2], denote y the point
(u1, u3, y) and 1 − y the point (u1, u3, 1 − y). By symmetry it is enough
to consider attacks occurring at y. Moreover, µ0, w3, w4 and w5 make the
patroller time indifferent, hence we only consider attacks at time 0.
µ0 intercepts the attack (y, 0) with probability 1− 1−2y6 = 56+ y3 . Indeed,
only the walks w1u, such that u belongs to the open interval {(u1, u3, α) | α ∈
(y, 1 − y)} do not intercept the attack. Finally, define µ˜ = 115 (δw3 + δw4 +
δw5) +
4
5µ
0, where δw is the Dirac measure at w ∈ W.
At any time, an attack at y ≤ 14 is intercepted by µ˜ with probability
1
15
· 3 + 4
5
(
5
6
+
y
3
)
≥ 3
15
+
4
5
· 5
6
=
13
15
.
An attack at y > 1/4 is intercepted by µ˜ with probability
1
15
· 2 + 4
5
(
5
6
+
y
3
)
≥ 2
15
+
4
5
(
5
6
+
1
12
)
=
13
15
.
Hence VN2(3, 0) ≥ 1315 .
Define the following attack a˜: choose uniformly a point in N2 × [0, 3].
The tour (u1, u2, u3, u1, u4, u3, u2, u1, u3, u4, u1) induces a 6-periodic walk w
6
which is a best reply for the patroller. Moreover g3,0(w
6, a˜) = 11/12. Hence
VN2(3, 0) ≤ 1112 .
Third case: m ≥ 4. The tour (u1, u2, u3, u1, u4, u3, u1) induces a 4-
periodic walk which guarantees 1 to the patroller. Hence VN2(m, 0) = 1.
3.4 Patrolling a simple search space in R2
In this section, we are interested in patrolling games in R2 for a large class
of search spaces called simple. To introduce this class of search spaces, we
first need to recall the notion of bounded variation of a function f .
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Definition 6. Let a > 0. Let f : [0, a] → Rn be a continuous function.
Then the total variation of f is the quantity:
TV (f) = sup
{
n∑
i=1
‖f(ti)− f(ti−1)‖2
∣∣∣∣ n ∈ N∗, 0 = t0 < t1 < · · · < tn = a
}
.
If TV (f) < +∞, then f is said to have bounded variation.
The next definition introduces a classical assumption on the boundary
of a search space in R2. This is a weak assumption already made in Gal
(1980) and Alpern and Gal (2003).
Definition 7. Let a > 0, let f1 and f2 be two continuous functions from
[0, a] to R such that f1 ≥ f2, f1 6= f2, and f1 and f2 have bounded variation.
Then the nonempty compact set {(x, t) ∈ [0, a] × R | f2(x) ≤ t ≤ f1(x)} is
called an elementary search space.
Let Q be the finite union of elementary search spaces such that any two
have disjoint interiors. If Q is path-connected, then it is called a simple
search space.
The next theorem is the main result on patrolling games on simple search
spaces. It gives a simple asymptotic expression of the value as the detec-
tion radius r goes to 0. The result relies on the fact that the patroller can
use a uniform strategy in the spirit of what has been done in the previ-
ous section for Eulerian networks. This strategy yields a lower bound that
asymptotically matches the upper bound of proposition 2.
As one would expect, the value goes to 0 as r goes to 0. It is interesting
to note that due to the movement of the patroller the convergence is linear
in r and not quadratic. Indeed, the relevant parameter is the sweep width
of the patroller and not the area of detection.
Theorem 2. If Q is a simple search space endowed with the Euclidean
norm, then
VQ(m, r) ∼ 2rm
λ(Q)
,
as r goes to 0.
4 Hiding games
Recall that the value of a hiding game is equal to the value of a patrolling
game with time limit m equal to 0. Hiding games have a value which repre-
sents the probability (up to ε) that the searcher and the hider are at distance
less that r when they play (ε-)optimally.
Proposition 3. The hiding game (Q, r) played in mixed strategies has a
value denoted VQ(r). Moreover the searcher has an optimal strategy and the
hider has an ε-optimal strategy with finite support.
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4.1 Equalizing strategies
We now study particular strategies called equalizing, these have been in-
troduced in Bishop and Evans (2013) when the search space is a graph (see
definition 7.3 and proposition 7.3 therein). We adapt those considerations
to our compact setting.
A strategy is equalizing if the induced payoff does not depend on the
strategy of the other player. The interest of equalizing strategies lies in the
fact that if such a strategy exists, then it is optimal for both players.
Definition 8. Let Q be a search space. A strategy µ ∈ ∆(Q) is said to be
equalizing if there exists c ∈ R+ such that µ(Br(y) ∩Q) = c for all y ∈ Q.
Proposition 4. Let µ ∈ ∆(Q). Then µ is an equalizing strategy (with
constant payoff c) if and only if µ is optimal for both players (and in that
case VQ(r) = c).
The following game is an example of a hiding game with finite search
space without equalizing strategies.
Example 3. Let r = 1 and Q = {x1, x2, x3, x4, x5} be the finite subset of R2
such that x1 = (0, 0), x2 = (0, 1), x3 = (1, 1), x4 = (1, 0) and x5 = (1/2, 0).
Denote for i ∈ {1, . . . , 5} Qi = {j ∈ {1, . . . , 5} | ‖xi − xj‖2 ≤ r}. That
is Q1 = {1, 2, 4, 5}, Q2 = {1, 2, 3}, Q3 = {2, 3, 4}, Q4 = {1, 3, 4, 5} and
Q5 = {1, 4, 5}.
The game (Q, r) admits an equalizing strategy if and only if the following
system of equations admits a solution p = (pi)1≤i≤5:
pi ≥ 0 for all i ∈ {1, . . . , 5}∑5
i=1 pi = 1∑
i∈Q1 pi =
∑
i∈Qj pi for all j ∈ {2, . . . , 5}.
(1)
It is easy to verify that this system does not admit a solution, hence the
game (Q, r) does not have an equalizing strategy.
4.2 An asymptotic result for hiding games
The next theorem is the main result on hiding games. For any search space
Q ⊂ Rn with positive Lebesgue measure, it gives a simple asymptotic ex-
pression of the value when the detection radius goes to 0. In this static
setting the value is equivalent, as r gos to 0, to the ratio of the volume of
the ball of radius r over the volume of Q. This result relies on the fact that
the searcher has a strategy that yields a lower bound which asymptotically
matches the upper bound of proposition 2.
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Theorem 3. Let Q be a compact subset of Rn. Suppose λ(Q) > 0. Then
VQ(r) ∼ λ(Br)
λ(Q)
as r goes to 0.
A consequence of theorem 3 is that for a compact set Q included in Rn
such that λ(Q) > 0, VQ(r) ∼ rn λ(B1)λ(Q) as r goes to 0. When λ(Q) = 0, it is
not always the case that VQ admits an equivalent of the form Mr
α, with α
and M positive, as r goes to 0, as it is shown in example 4.
Example 4. Let Q ⊂ [0, 1] be the following Cantor-type set. Define C0 =
[0, 1], and for all n ∈ N∗ Cn = 14Cn−1 ∪
(
3
4 +
1
4Cn−1
)
. Finally, let Q =⋂
n∈N
Cn. Q is compact and λ(Q) = 0.
The value of the hiding game played on Q is given by the following
formula:
VQ(r) =

1
2n if r ∈
[
1
22n ,
3
22n
)
,
1
2n−1 if r ∈
[
3
22n ,
1
22(n−1)
)
, n ∈ N∗.
Indeed, let Σ1 = {0, 1} and for all n ∈ N∗\{1} let Σn = 14Σn−1∪
(
3
4 +
1
4Σn−1
)
.
For n ∈ N∗, consider the following strategy σn: choose uniformly a point in
Σn, that is with probability
1
|Σn| =
1
2n . Let n ∈ N∗ suppose r ∈
[
1
22n ,
3
22n
)
.
Then for all q ∈ Q there is exactly one point s in Σn such that |q − s| ≤ r.
Hence σn is an equalizing strategy which guarantees
1
2n to both players.
Let Σ′1 = {14} and for all n ∈ N∗\{1} let Σ′n = 14Σ′n−1∪
(
1− 14Σ′n−1
)
. For
n ∈ N∗ consider the following strategy σ′n: choose uniformly a point in Σ′n,
that is with probability 1|Σ′n| =
1
2n−1 . Suppose now that r ∈
[
3
22n ,
1
22(n−1)
)
.
Then for all q ∈ Q there is exactly one point s in Σ′n such that |q − s| ≤ r.
Hence σ′n is an equalizing strategy which guarantees
1
2n−1 to both players.
In particular, for all n ∈ N∗
VQ
(
1
22n−1
)
= VQ
(
1
22n
)
=
1
2n
.
Let (rn)n∈N∗ =
(
1
2n
)
n∈N∗ and let α > 0. Then for all n ∈ N
∗
VQ(r2n−1)
(r2n−1)α
=
1
2α
2(2α−1)n and
VQ(r2n)
(r2n)α
= 2(2α−1)n.
Thus we have
lim
n→+∞
VQ(r2n−1)
(r2n−1)α
=

+∞ if α > 1/2
1√
2
if α = 1/2
0 if α < 1/2
and lim
n→+∞
VQ(r2n)
(r2n)α
=

+∞ if α > 1/2
1 if α = 1/2
0 if α < 1/2.
Hence r 7→ VQ(r) does not admit an equivalent of the form r 7→Mrα, with
α and M positive numbers, as r goes to 0.
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5 Properties of the value function of patrolling
and hiding games
In this section we give some elementary properties of the function VQ for
patrolling and hiding games.
5.1 The value function of patrolling games
Proposition 5. Let Q be a search space. The function
VQ : R+ × R+ → [0, 1]
(m, r) 7→ VQ(m, r)
is
i) non decreasing in m and r,
ii) upper semi-continuous in r for all m,
iii) upper semi-continuous in m for all r.
Example 5 in the next section shows that in general, for fixedm, VQ(·,m)
is not lower semi-continuous.
Remark 2. Let m, r ≥ 0, and Q1, Q2 be two search spaces, it is clear that if
Q1 ⊂ Q2 then the attacker is better off in Q2 hence VQ1(m, r) ≥ VQ2(m, r).
5.2 The value function of hiding games
Recall that the value of a hiding game is equal to the value of a patrolling
game with time limit m equal to 0. Hence, the negative results presented in
this section also hold for patrolling games when m = 0.
The following simple example of a hiding game on the unit interval was
first solved by Ruckle (1983). It shows that in general, VQ is not lower
semi-continuous.
Example 5. Let Q be the [0, 1] interval, then
VQ(r) =
min
(
⌈ 12r ⌉−1, 1
)
if r > 0
0 otherwise.
Indeed, it is clear when r equals 0 and r ≥ 1/2. Let n ∈ N∗ and suppose
r ∈
[
1
2(n+1) ,
1
2n
)
. Then the patroller guarantees 1n+1 by choosing equiprob-
ably a point in
{
1+2k
2(n+1)
}
0≤k≤n. And the attacker, choosing equiprobably a
point in
{
(2+ε)k
2(n+1)
}
0≤k≤n, with 0 < ε ≤ 2/n, also guarantees
1
n+1 .
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The next proposition disproves the somehow intuitive belief that the
value of hiding games is continuous with respect to the Haussdorff metric
between nonempty compact sets.
Proposition 6. Let r ≥ 0. The function which maps any search space Q
to VQ(r) is in general not continuous with respect to the Hausdorff metric
between nonempty compact sets.
Proof. Let Ds = {x ∈ R2 | ‖x‖2 ≤ s} be the Euclidean disc of radius s > 0
centered at 0. From Danskin (1990), it is known that
VDs(1) =
1 if s ∈ [0, 1]1
pi arcsin
(
1
s
)
if s ∈
(
1,
√
2
]
.
Hence lims→1,s>1 VDs(1) =
1
2 < 1.
The intuition is the following: it is clear that when s equals 1 the searcher
guarantees 1 by playing x = (0, 0). Suppose now that s equals 1 + ε. Then
the searcher covers almost all the area of the disc but less than half of its
circumference. Hence the hider guarantees 1/2 by choosing uniformly a
point on the boundary of Ds.
6 Appendix: omitted proofs
Subsection 3.1
Proof of proposition 1. Let us first define a metric on the set W inducing
the topology of compact convergence. For n ∈ N, define Kn = [0, n]. Then
D : W ×W → R+
(f, g) 7→
∞∑
n=1
1
2n sup
x∈Kn
‖f(x)− g(x)‖.
is a metric on W.
We recall the following fact about the topology of compact convergence
topology.
Proposition 7 (Application of theorem 46.2 in Munkres (2000)). Let Q
be a search space. A sequence fn : R+ → Q of functions converges to the
function f in the topology of compact convergence if and only if for each
compact subspace K of R+, the sequence fn|K converges uniformly to f |K .
The following corollary follows from Sion’s theorem, Sion (1958).
Corollary 1 (Proposition A.10 in Sorin (2002)). Let (X,Y, g) be a zero-sum
game such that: X is a compact metric space, for all y ∈ Y , the function
g(·, y) is upper semi-continuous. Then the game (∆(X),∆f (Y ), g) has a
value and player 1 has an optimal strategy.
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We are now able to complete the proof. By Ascoli’s theorem (applica-
tion of theorem 47.1 in Munkres (2000)), W is compact for the topology of
compact convergence. Moreover, for all (y, t) ∈ A the function gm,r(·, (y, t))
is upper semi-continuous. The conclusion follows from corollary 1.
Subsection 3.3
Proof of lemma 1. Let pi = (u1, u2, . . . , un−1, un), u1 = un = u ∈ V be an
Eulerian tour. Without loss of generality, suppose l(ui, ui+1) 6= 0 for all
i ∈ {1, . . . , n− 1}. The parametrization is constructed in the following way.
If t ∈ [0, l(u1, u2)] then
w(t) =
(
u1, u2,
t
l(u1, u2)
)
.
Else, suppose n ≥ 3. For all k ∈ {2, . . . , n− 1} if
t ∈
(
k−1∑
i=1
l(ui, ui+1),
k∑
i=1
l(ui, ui+1)
]
then
w(t) =
(
uk, uk+1,
t−∑k−1i=1 l(ui, ui+1)
l(uk, uk+1)
)
.
It is not difficult to verify that such w is appropriate.
Proof of theorem 1. If m ≥ λ(N ), the patroller guarantees 1 by playing a
parametrization of N . Suppose that m < λ(N ). Let (y, t) ∈ N × R+ be
a pure strategy of the attacker and let w be a in definition 4. There exists
ty ∈ [0, λ(N )] such that w(ty) = y. Now let t0 ∈ [ty − t −m, ty − t]. Then
wt0(ty − t0) = w(ty) = y. And ty − t0 ∈ [t, t+m]. Thus y ∈ wt0([t, t +m]).
Hence under the patroller’s uniform strategy
P(y ∈ wt0([t, t+m])) ≥ P(t0 ∈ [ty − t−m, ty − t]) =
m
λ(N ) .
The other inequality follows from proposition 2 since in this case, ρ equals
1.
Subsection 3.4
To prove theorem 2 we first need some preliminary definition and lemmas.
Definition 9. Let Q be a search space. A continuous function L : [0, 1] → Q
such that L(0) = L(1) is called an r-tour if for any x ∈ Q there exists
l ∈ L([0, 1]) such that d(x, l) ≤ r.
The next lemma shows that when the radius of detection r is small, one
can find in Q an r-tour with length not exceeding λ(Q)/2r, up to some ε.
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Lemma 2 (Lemma 3.39 in Alpern and Gal (2003)). Let Q ⊂ R2 be a simple
search space. Endow Q with the Euclidean norm. Then for any ε > 0 there
exits rε > 0 such that for any r < rε there exists an r-tour L : [0, 1] → Q
such that
TV (L) ≤ (1 + ε)λ(Q)
2r
.
The next lemma gives a parametrization of L([0, 1]) in terms of walks.
Lemma 3. Let L be an r-tour as in lemma 2. Then for all ε′ > 0 there
exists w : [0, TV (L) + ε′]→ L([0, 1]) continuous such that:
i) w(0) = w(TV (L) + ε′),
ii) w is surjective,
iii) w is 1-Lipschitz continuous,
iv) TV (w) = TV (L).
w is extended to a (TV (L)+ε′)-periodic function on R, which is still denoted
w.
Proof of lemma 3. Let ε′ > 0 and let f : [0, 1] → [0, TV (L) + ε
′]
s 7→ TV (L|[0,s]) + ε′s.
The function f is increasing and continuous on [0, 1], hence f is an homeo-
morphism. Define w as L◦f−1 on [0, TV (L)+ε′]. It is not difficult to prove
that such w verifies the condition of the lemma.
We are now able to prove theorem 2.
Proof of theorem 2. Let L and w be as in lemma 2 and lemma 3 respectively.
For all t0 ∈ [0, TV (L) + ε′] define wt0(·) as w(t0 + ·).
Let (l, t) ∈ L([0, 1])×R+ . By lemma 3 ii), there exists tl ∈ [0, TV (L)+ε′]
such that w(tl) = l. Now let t0 ∈ [tl − t − m, tl − t]. Then wt0(tl − t0) =
w(tl) = l. And tl − t0 ∈ [t, t+m]. Hence l ∈ wt0([t, t+m]).
Suppose t0 is chosen uniformly in [0, TV (L) + ε
′]. By lemma 3 iii) this
is an admissible strategy for the patroller. Let (y, t) ∈ A be a pure strategy
of the attacker. Then if l ∈ L([0, 1]) is such that d(y, l) ≤ r,
P(d(y,wt0([t, t +m])) ≤ r) ≥ P(l ∈ wt0([t, t+m])),
≥ P(t0 ∈ [tl − t−m, tl − t])
=
m
TV (L) + ε′
.
By lemma 2, this last quantity is grater than or equal to m(1+ε)λ(Q)
2r
+ε′
. Hence
the patroller guarantees m(1+ε)λ(Q)
2r
+ε′
for all ε′ > 0, that is
VQ(m, r) ≥ 2rm
(1 + ε)λ(Q)
∼ 2rm
λ(Q)
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as r goes to 0.
In this context, proposition 2 yields VQ(m, r) ≤ 2rm+pir2λ(Q) ∼ 2rmλ(Q) as r
goes to 0 (see remark 1).
Subsection 4.1
Proof of proposition 4. Suppose µ ∈ ∆(Q) is an equalizing strategy. If the
searcher plays µ, then for all y ∈ Q µ(Br(y) ∩ Q) = c, hence VQ(r) ≥ c.
Symmetrically, if the hider plays µ, then for all x ∈ Q µ(Br(x) ∩ Q) = c,
hence VQ(r) ≤ c, and VQ(r) = c.
Conversely, suppose µ ∈ ∆(Q) is optimal for both players. Then the
searcher guaranties VQ(r) that is for all y ∈ Q µ(Br(y) ∩ Q) ≥ VQ(r), and
the hider guaranties VQ(r) that is for all x ∈ Q µ(Br(x)∩Q) ≤ VQ(r). Hence
for all y ∈ Q
µ(Br(y) ∩Q) = VQ(r).
Subsection 4.2
To prove theorem 3 we first need to introduce a technical lemma.
Denote B2r (x) = {y ∈ Rn | ‖x− y‖2 ≤ r} the closed ball of center x with
radius r for the Euclidean norm, and ∂B2r (x) = {y ∈ Rn | ‖x− y‖2 = r}
the sphere of center x with radius r for the Eucliean norm.
The intuition behind lemma 4 below is the following. We consider the
balls B2ε (0) and B
2
r (x) with x on the boundary of B
2
ε (0). When r goes to
zero, the ratio between the volume of the ball B2r (x) and the ball B
2
r (x)
intersected with the ball B2ε (0) goes to 2. Lemma 4 gives an upper bound
to this ratio, as r goes to 0, for a non necessary Euclidean ball Br(x).
Lemma 4. Let ‖·‖ be a norm on Rn and c1, c2 > 0 be such that c1 ‖·‖ ≤
‖·‖2 ≤ c2 ‖·‖. Then for all x ∈ ∂B2ε (0)
lim sup
r→0
λ(Br)
λ(B2ε (0) ∩Br(x))
≤ 2
(
c2
c1
)n
.
Proof of lemma 4. Let x ∈ ∂B2ε (0), let ε > 0. Denote I the regularized
incomplete Beta function: for a, b > 0 and 0 < z < 1, Iz(a, b) =
B(z;a,b)
B(a,b) .
Where B(z; a, b) =
∫ z
0 t
a−1(1 − t)b−1dt and B(a, b) = B(1; a, b) is the Beta
function. Then we have, see Li (2011),
λ
(
B2ε (0) ∩B2r (x)
)
=
pin/2
2Γ(n2 + 1)
(
rnI
1−( r2ε)
2
(
n+ 1
2
,
1
2
)
+ εnI
( rε)
2
(
1−( r2ε )
2
) (n+ 1
2
,
1
2
))
.
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Since t 7→ tn−12 (1− t)−1/2 is integrable over [0, 1),
I
1−( r2ε )
2
(
n+ 1
2
,
1
2
)
=
∫ 1−( r2ε )2
0 t
n−1
2 (1− t)−1/2dt
B(n−12 ,
1
2 )
→ 1,
as r goes to 0. And,
I
( rε )
2
(
1−( r2ε)
2
) (n+ 1
2
,
1
2
)
=
∫ ( rε)2(1−( r2ε )2)
0 t
n−1
2 (1− t)−1/2dt
B(n−12 ,
1
2)
which, since 1 ≤ (1− t)−1/2 when t ∈ [0, 1), is greater than
2
n+1
( r
ε
)n+1 (
1− ( r2ε)2)n+12
B(n−12 ,
1
2)
=
2rn+1
(n+ 1)εn+1B(n−12 ,
1
2)
+ o(r2n+2)
when r goes to 0. Hence we have
λ
(
B2ε (0) ∩B2r (x)
)
≥ pi
n/2
2Γ(n2 + 1)
(rn + o(rn))
as r goes to 0. Moreover since
B2ε (0) ∩Br(x) = {y ∈ Rn | ‖y‖2 ≤ ε and ‖x− y‖ ≤ r}
⊃ {y ∈ Rn | ‖y‖2 ≤ ε and ‖x− y‖2 ≤ c1r},
and Br(0) ⊂ B2c2r(0), we have λ
(
B2ε (0) ∩Br(x)
) ≥ λ (B2ε (0) ∩B2c1r(x)) ,
and cn2λ(B
2
r ) ≥ λ(Br). Finally, dividing by λ
(
B2ε (0) ∩Br(x)
)
and taking
the lim sup, since λ(B2r ) =
pin/2rn
Γ(n2 +1)
lim sup
r→0
λ(Br)
λ (B2ε (0) ∩Br(x))
≤ lim sup
r→0
cn2λ(B
2
r )
λ
(
B2ε (0) ∩B2c1r(x)
) ≤ 2(c2
c1
)n
.
We are now able to prove theorem 3.
Proof of theorem 3. Let ε > 0 and r ∈ (0, ε). We regularize the boundary
of Q by defining Qε = Q + B
2
ε (0), and I
ε(r) = {y ∈ Qε | Br(y) ⊂ Qε}.
Define as well λεmin(r) = miny∈Qε λ(Br(y) ∩ Qε). Finally define µ ∈ ∆(Qε)
such that for all B ⊂ Qε measurable
µ(B) =
λ (B ∩ Iε(r))λεmin(r) + λ(B ∩ (Qε \ Iε(r))λ(Br)
λ(Iε(r))λεmin(r) + λ(Br)λ(Qε \ Iε(r))
.
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Since by definition λ(Br) ≥ λεmin(r), for all x ∈ Qε
µ(Br(x) ∩Qε) ≥ λ
ε
min(r)λ(Br)
λ(Iε(r))λεmin(r) + λ(Br)λ(Qε \ Iε(r))
.
Because the hider can play in (Qε, r) as he would play in (Q, r), VQε(r) ≤
VQ(r). By proposition 2,
λεmin(r)λ(Br)
λ(Iε(r))λεmin(r) + λ(Br)λ(Qε \ Iε(r))
≤ VQε(r) ≤ VQ(r) ≤
λ(Br)
λ(Q)
.
Dividing by λ(Br)/λ(Q),
λεmin(r)λ(Q)
λ(Iε(r))λεmin(r) + λ(Br)λ(Qε \ Iε(r))
≤ VQ(r)λ(Q)
λ(Br)
≤ 1. (2)
Let us show that for all ε > 0
⋃
r>0 I
ε(r) = Q˚ε. Indeed, let y ∈⋃
r>0 I
ε(r). There exists r > 0 such that y ∈ Iε(r). Thus there exists
r > 0 such that Br(y) ⊂ Qε. Conversely, let y ∈ Q˚ε. There exists r′ > 0
such that B′r′(y) ⊂ Q˚ε, where B′r′(y) = {x ∈ Rn | ‖x − y‖ < r′}. Take
0 < r < r′, then Br(y) ⊂ Q˚ε hence y ∈ Iε(r).
For all r1, r2 > 0 such that r1 > r2 one has I
ε(r1) ⊂ Iε(r2). Hence
limr→0 λ(Iε(r)) = λ(Q˚ε). Dividing by λεmin(r) and letting r go to 0 in
equation (2), by lemma 4 one has, since the minimum in λεmin(r) is reached
on the boundary of a Euclidean ball,
λ(Q)
λ(Q˚ε) + 2
(
c2
c1
)n
λ(∂Qε)
≤ lim inf
r→0
VQ(r)λ(Q)
λ(Br)
≤ lim sup
r→0
VQ(r)λ(Q)
λ(Br)
≤ 1.
(3)
Let us show that
⋂
ε>0 Q˚ε =
⋂
ε>0Qε = Q. Indeed, let y ∈
⋂
ε>0Qε.
For all ε > 0 minz∈Q ‖y − z‖2 ≤ ε, hence y ∈ Q. Conversely, for all ε > 0
Q ⊂ Q˚ε hence Q ⊂ ⋂ε>0 Q˚ε. Moreover for all ε1, ε2 > 0 such that ε1 < ε2
one has Qε1 ⊂ Qε2. Hence limε→0 λ(Q˚ε) = λ(Q), limε→0 λ(Qε) = λ(Q) and
λ(∂Qε) = λ(Qε)− λ(Q˚ε) so limε→0 λ(∂Qε) = 0.
Letting ε→ 0 in equation (3), 1 = λ(Q)λ(Q) ≤ limr→0
VQ(r)λ(Q)
λ(Br)
≤ 1.
Subsection 5.1
Proof of proposition 5. Since i) is direct we only prove ii). For all (m, r) ∈
R
2
+,
VQ(m, r) = max
µ∈∆(W)
inf
(y,t)∈A
∫
W
gm,r(w, (y, t))dµ(w)
= inf
(y,t)∈A
∫
W
gm,r(w, (y, t))dµ
∗(w),
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where µ∗ ∈ ∆(W) is an optimal strategy of the patroller. Let (y, t) ∈ A
and m ≥ 0. For all w ∈ W, the function r 7→ gm,r(w, (y, t)) is upper semi-
continuous, as the indicator function of a closed set. Let rn → r, then by
Fatou’s lemma,
lim sup
n
∫
W
gm,rn(w, (y, t))dµ
∗(w) ≤
∫
W
lim sup
n
gm,rn(w, (y, t))dµ
∗(w)
≤
∫
W
gm,r(w, (y, t))dµ
∗(w).
Thus the function r 7→ ∫W gm,r(w, (y, t))dµ∗(w) is upper semi-continuous.
Hence
VQ(m, ·) : r 7→ inf
(y,t)∈A
∫
W
gm,r(w, (y, t))dµ
∗(w)
is upper semi-continuous.
Since for all w ∈ W, the function m 7→ gm,r(w, (y, t)) is upper semi-
continuous, as the indicator function of a closed set, the proof of iii) is
strictly analogous.
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